

Clarke's
A
REPLY
TO
Mr. *Clark's* Defence
Of his LETTER to
Mr. DODWELL.

WITH
A POSTSCRIPT relating to
Mr. *Milles's* Answer to Mr. *Dodwell's*
Epistolary Discourse.

—*Jesus Christ, who hath abolish'd Death, and
hath brought Life and Immortality to Life thro
the Gospel, 2 Tim. 1. 10.*

M. Evolve igitur librum Platonis qui est de animo :
amplius quod desideres, nihil erit.

A. Feci mehercule & quidem sapius, sed nescio
quomodo dum lego, assentior: cum posui librum & me-
cum ipse de immortalitate animorum, cepi cogitare assen-
sio omnis illa elabatur.

M. T. Ciceronis Tuscularum Quaestionum lib. 1.

L O N D O N;

Printed in the Year M. DCC. VII.

A

REPLY

TO

Mr. Clark's Defence

OF HIS LETTER TO

Mr. DODWELL

WITNESSES


A POSTSCRIPT relating to

Mr. Miller's Answer to Mr. Dodwell's

Epistle to the Editors

By the Author of the "Epistle to the Editors," who has also published "The History of the Church of England, from the Reformation to the Present Time," &c.

Mr. Dodwell's letter, which is a very able and interesting one, has been published in the "Quarterly Review," and has been the subject of much discussion. The author of the "Epistle to the Editors" has been accused of having written it, and has been obliged to defend himself. The present work is a reply to Mr. Dodwell's letter, and is intended to show that the author of the "Epistle to the Editors" is not the same person as the author of the "Quarterly Review."



Printed in the Year MDCCLXXVII

A
R E P L Y

T O

Mr. Clark's DEFENCE of his
LETTER to Mr. Dodwell.

THE Importance of the *Question concerning the Possibility of Matter's thinking, and the Ability of Mr. Clark to urge to the best advantage, whatever can be said on that side of it which he espouses, make me presume it will not be unacceptable to the impartial Reader, to see what Answer can be given to his Defence of an Argument, made use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwel, to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, by the Author of the Objections to that Argument ; who still thinks it inconclusive, and*

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proposes to show its inconclusiveness in the following Papers, and thereby to contribute towards the Establishment of the Immortality of Man on that Evidence only that God has thought fit to afford us of it; and by a *new Instance* assert the Freedom and Liberty, so peculiar to the Country wherein we live, of examining the Grounds and Reasons of prevailing Opinions. But if he happens to fail in the Execution of his Design, either thro the Weakness of his Cause, or his own Inability to deal with so learned an Adversary; yet he is very sure not to err in any thing but a matter of Speculation. He is not dispos'd to use any foreign or unmannerly Mixture in any Debate, much less when engag'd with a Gentleman, who by confining himself solely to the Argument, sets so unusual an Example of fair dealing in Controversy.

Letter to
Mr. Dod-
well, p.

The Argument made use of by Mr. Clark, to prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul, was, *That the Soul cannot possibly be material, is demonstrable from the single Consideration even of bare Sense and Consciousness it self: for Matter being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separable and distinct Parts; 'tis plain, unless it were essentially conscious, in which case every Particle of Matter must consist of innumerable*

Con

Consciousnesses, no System of it, in any possible Composition or Division, can be an Individual Conscious Being. For suppose three or three hundred Particles of Matter at a Mile or any given distance one from another, is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual conscious Being? Suppose then all these Particles be brought together into one System, so as to touch one another; Will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were at the greatest distance? how then can their being dispos'd in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being? If you suppose God by his Infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles; yet still those Particles being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inheres; but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the addition of something, which in all the Particles must still it self be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whose Power of thinking is undeniably one individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a material Substance.

Against this Argument I offer'd several Objections, which I shall repeat and defend, in the same Order that Mr.

Clark has thought fit to consider them.
The first is as follows,

“ 1. Let us suppose, with *Mr. Clark*,
“ that a material Substance in any man-
“ ner dispos’d, is not an individual Be-
“ ing; yet I cannot see, but that an indi-
“ vidual Power may reside in a material
“ System, which consists of actually sepa-
“ rate and distinct Parts; and conse-
“ quently that an individual Being is not
“ indispensably necessary to be the subject
“ of an individual Power. Now if an
“ individual Power can be lodg’d by God
“ in, or superadded to that which is not
“ an individual Being, or follows from
“ the Composition or Modification of a
“ material System, consisting of actually
“ separate and distinct Particles; the ve-
“ ry Soul and Strength of *Mr. Clark’s*
“ Demonstration is gone. And Matter of
“ Fact is so plain and obvious, that a
“ Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will
“ meet with material Systems, wherein
“ there are individual Powers, which are
“ not in every one, nor in any one of the
“ Particles that compose them, when ta-
“ ken apart and consider’d singly. Let
“ us instance, for example, in a *Rose*, that
“ consists of several Particles, which se-
“ parately and singly want a Power to
“ produce that agreeable Sensation we
“ experience in them when united. And
“ there-

“ therefore either each of the Particles in
 “ that Union contributes to the individual
 “ Power, which is the external Cause of
 “ our Sensation; or else God Almighty
 “ superadds the Power of producing that
 “ Sensation in us, upon the Union of the
 “ Particles: and this, for ought I can see,
 “ may be the case of Matter’s thinking.
 “ Those Particles which compose the
 “ Brain, may under that Modification,
 “ either have the Power of thinking ne-
 “ cessarily flowing from them, or else
 “ may have the Power of thinking super-
 “ added to them by the Power of God,
 “ tho singly and separately they may not
 “ have the Power of thinking. The
 “ Fallacy of Mr. *Clark*’s Argument, by
 “ which as I take it he deceives himself,
 “ lies in this, that by an individual Pow-
 “ er he understands a Power which can
 “ only proceed from or reside in an indi-
 “ vidual Being; which is a plain begging
 “ of the Question, or supposing the thing
 “ in dispute, that *Thinking is such an in-*
 “ *dividual Power*: to prove which he has
 “ not, tho all he says depends on it, of-
 “ fer’d so much as one word, and I con-
 “ ceive cannot, till he is perfectly acquain-
 “ ted with the nature of Thinking. I rea-
 “ dily acknowledg, that we can distin-
 “ guish the various Modes of thinking
 “ from one another; but whether Think-

“ing is such a kind of Operation as pro-
 “ceeds from an Individual Being, or whe-
 “ther it proceeds from a Being which
 “consists of actually separate and dis-
 “tinct Parts, I must be content to be
 “ignorant till some better proof is pro-
 “duc’d to place it in an Individual Being,
 “than by calling it an Individual Power.

Page 9.

To answer this Objection Mr. Clark says,
That all Powers and Qualitys may be distin-
guish’d into three sorts. 1. Some Qualitys
there are which do, strictly and properly speak-
ing, inhere in the Substance to which they are
ascrib’d. And concerning these it is evident,
that every Power or Quality that is or can be
inherent in any System of Matter, is nothing
else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many
Powers or Qualitys of the same kind inhe-
rent in all the Parts. The Magnitude of
any Body is nothing else but the Sum of the
Magnitudes of all its Parts: Its Motion is
nothing else but the Sum of the Motions of all
its Parts. And if Cogitation in like man-
ner could possibly be a Quality, really inhe-
rent in a System of Matter, it must likewise
necessarily be the Sum and Result of the Co-
gitations of the several Parts, and so there
would be as many distinct Consciousnesses as
there are Particles of Matter. 2. Other
Powers, which are vulgarly look’d on as In-
dividual Powers, resulting from and residing
in the whole System, without residing particu-
larly

larly in each or any of its single and original Parts ; such as the Sweetness of certain Bodys, their Colours, &c. but this is only a gross and vulgar Error. 3. Other Powers, such as Magnetism and Electrical Attractions, are not real Qualitys at all residing in any Subject, but merely abstract Names, to express the Effects of some determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter : And Gravitation it self is not a Quality inhering in Matter, or that can possibly result from any Texture or Composition, but only an Effect of the continual and regular Operation of some other Being upon it, by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under these three Heads must necessarily be contain'd all possible Qualitys, Modes or Powers whatsoever : And now the Question is among which of these three sorts of Powers must Conscientiousness or Thinking bereckon'd. I suppose it will neither be said to be a mere abstract Name, nor yet an Effect produc'd in or upon a foreign Substance (as the Sweetness and Colour of a Rose is not any individual Power in the Rose it self, but merely a Sensation excited in him that smells or sees it) but that it is a Quality or Power truly and really inhering in the thinking Substance it self. And therefore if that thinking Substance be a System of Matter, the former reasoning holds strictly and demonstratively true, that the Conscientiousness must inhere in all and every one of the

the Particles of that System taken singly as well as together. To suppose any Power or Quality of this kind arising from or belonging to the several Parts of which the Whole consists, is a direct and express Contradiction: 'Tis supposing either an Universal to exist without Particulars, or an Effect to be produc'd without a Cause; or that a Quality is, by the power of God, made so to arise out of nothing, as to be superadded to a Subject, and to subsist without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the same time suppos'd to belong.

1. Before I make any return to this Answer of Mr. Clark, it will not be improper to fix and determin the precise Significations of some Words on which the Question turns. The Question being, Whether a System of Matter can have a Power of thinking, or an individual Consciousness superadded to it, or flow from any Modification of that System; it is evident, that by a *Power of thinking* is understood, not a *Capacity to think*, but *actual thinking*, for else *Consciousness* could not be properly employ'd, by Mr. Clark, to signify the same thing with a *Power of thinking*.

2. The Term Individual, when apply'd to Power, must likewise signify barely *One Power* without any Determination; whether that *Power* proceed from an Individual

dual or an actually divided or divisible Being : for if an *individual Power* signifies a Power which proceeds from or inheres in an individual Being, and Consciousness be suppos'd such an individual Power, and the Question is, Whether Consciousness or any individual Power can reside in a System of Matter, or a Being that is not individual; there is no ground to dispute, whether a System of Matter can have Consciousness, or any other individual Power, on such Suppositions. It is evident, that on those Suppositions a System of Matter cannot possibly think; for a System of Matter being suppos'd to consist of Parts and Thinking or Consciousness being suppos'd to be a Power incapable of residing in a Being that consists of Parts, the Question of Matter's thinking will amount to this, *Whether that which cannot think, can think.* I do not, by what I have said, exclude Mr. Clark from contending for Consciousness or Thinking's being a Power that can only reside in an individual Being. He is at his liberty to make that a Question whenever he thinks fit, and I shall be very glad to see what so able a Gentleman can say to give me Light into the Nature of Thinking. But all that I contend for is, that Thinking be not suppos'd an individual Power, in a Sense that begs the Question

Question between us, till it be prov'd individual in that sense ; and then I will allow, that there is no ground to dispute whether a System can think. These things being clear'd, I answer to Mr. Clark's Argument.

I. That it is nothing else but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*. For by enumerating his three sorts of Powers or Qualitys of Matter, and showing that the two last of the sorts are improperly call'd Powers or Qualitys, he does suppose that a System of Matter has, and can have only Powers of one sort or kind, such as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind ; which, what is it else but to argue, That because we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it has and can have no other Powers of a different kind from Magnitude and Motion? Whereas he ought to have demonstrated, if he would have prov'd the Point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other Power in any System of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind ; and then there might have been some ground to conclude, *That if Consciousness be really inherent in a System of Matter, it must be the Sum or Result of the Consciousnesses*

nesses of the several parts : for till it is demonstrated, that there can be no other Power in any System of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, it may as well be suppos'd, that there are Powers of different kinds in different Particles of Matter, or that God can superadd different kinds of Powers to the different Parts of a material System; and then the Action or Power exerted, resulting from them when united, will be of a different sort or species from any Power inhering in the Particles singly consider'd, and so far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a different kind. And if so, then Mr. *Clark* must prove, that Consciousness is not an Action or actual Power resulting from an Union of different kinds of Powers, or else he will not be able to prove the Impossibility of Matter's thinking from its Divisibility, or its being actually divided *in infinitum*; for on supposition that there are Powers of different kinds in different parts of the same material System, and that Consciousness cannot be prov'd to be, properly speaking, an Individual Power, or a Power which can only reside in an Individual Being, there will be no reason to conclude, *That if Consciousness be really inherent in a*
System

System of Matter, it must be the Sum or Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts : but the contrary, That if Consciousness does inhere in a System of Matter, it must not be the Sum or Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts; and all Mr. Clark's Difficultys, founded on Matter's consisting of actually separate and distinct Parts, will be remov'd; for it will then be no Contradiction to suppose a Power arising from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole consists, no more than it will be to conceive that a Whole is not the same with a piece of a Clock: for the Power resulting from the different contributing Powers in the System, neither belongs to any part of the System when consider'd by it self, nor is it of the same sort or kind with any Power in any part of the System, nor will there be any ground to suppose an Universal to exist without Particulars, but a particular Power existing to which several particular Powers contribute, as every Man is a particular Man, tho various Powers are necessary to constitute him of the Species: nor, lastly, to suppose an Effect produc'd without a Cause; for the different Powers in the single and separate Parts of a System of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cause of the Existence of that Power which did not exist in the Particles

ticles singly consider'd. And thus it may be conceiv'd, that there may be a Power in all those Particles which compose the Brain, to contribute to the act of Thinking, before they are united under that Form; tho while they are disunited, they have no more of Consciousness than any Being which produces Sweetness in us (that is made up of Parts wherein different Powers inhere) when under a particular Form, has a power to produce Sweetness in us, when its Parts are disunited and separated.

2. Tho I have suppos'd different Parts of Matter, in the same System, to have actual Powers essentially different; yet I will allow that Matter is every where under the same Circumstances, endow'd with the same Powers; and that, taking the whole material World together, every Particle thereof is capable of contributing to all the actual Powers of Matter equally with any other Particle whatever. But then if these actual Powers exist but only under such and such Regulations, and that a Disposition of Parts by Motion be necessary to the Exertion of every Power, it will equally follow, that the Power of every System will not be the Sum of Powers of the same kind, but be the Sum of Powers of different kinds; because by the different Situation of Parts in a System,

a different Power is exerted in every Particle, tho each of them would exert the same Power under the same Circumstance or Position. And I much rather take this to be the Case, than to suppose really different Powers founded on different Capacities in the different Parts of Matter; for by Experience we see that every thing by change of Form becomes every thing. The same Parts of Matter become Parts of *Dung, Earth, Grass, Corn, Sheep, Horses, Men, &c.* and act their Parts under these Mutations: and I would add, as what seems equally matter of fact to me, That the Matter of which Egg consists, doth intirely constitute the young one, and that the Action of Sensation began under a particular disposition of the Parts by Motion, without the addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, as the Powers of Vegetation, Gravitation, of producing the Sensation of Heat, Cold, Red, Blue, Yellow, are perform'd without the addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, had not the System-makers of *Europe* thought fit to deny it, in order to etch out their Hypotheses.

3. Mr. *Clark* has not rightly enumerated the known Powers of Matter. In order to make that appear, let us consider what we mean by *Power*. By Power I understand in the Question between us, *An*
actual

actual Ability to make or receive any Change, to act or be acted on. The Question then will be, whether there is in any System of Matter a Power to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on, that is not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind? Now that there are Powers in Systems of Matter, that are not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, is apparent from this Consideration, That not only mere Magnitude and Motion is necessary to the making or receiving some sort of change, but the particular Texture of a Being. Now the Texture, let it be of the Eye, Ear, or any other part of Man, is essentially different from the Texture of other Beings, and the Texture of the Parts of the Being it self; and it is from its Texture, as well as from its Magnitude and Motion, that the Matter of which the Eye consists, has a power to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on: which Power depends so intirely on the particular Texture, that upon the least alteration of some Parts of the Eye, it ceases to have a power of being operated on by external Objects, or of contributing to the act of Vision. And if the Powers of a System of Matter may intirely cease upon the least Alteration of a part of that System, it is evident that the Powers of the System inhere not in its

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Parts

Parts in the same sense with Magnitude and Motion: for divide and vary the Parts of Matter as much as you will, there will be Magnitude, and may be Motion; but divide or vary the least part of the Eye, and the Power of contributing towards the act of Vision is intirely at an end.

4. I had said, " That the Fallacy of
 " Mr. *Clark's* Argument, by which as I
 " took it he deceiv'd himself, lies in this,
 " That by an Individual Power he un-
 " derstands a Power which can only pro-
 " ceed from or reside in an Individual Be-
 " ing, which is a plain begging of the
 " Question, or supposing the thing in dis-
 " pute, that Thinking is such an Indivi-
 " dual Power. To prove which he has
 " not, tho' all he says depends on it, of-
 " fer'd so much as one word, and I con-
 " ceive cannot be done till he is perfectly
 " acquainted with the nature of Think-
 " ing. I readily acknowledg that we can
 " distinguish the various modes of Think-
 " ing from one another; but whether
 " Thinking is such a kind of Operation as
 " proceeds from an Individual Being, or
 " whether it proceeds from a Being that
 " consists of Parts, I must be content to
 " be ignorant, till some better proof is
 " produc'd to place it in an Individual Be-
 " ing, than by calling it an Individual
 " Power. To

To manifest this, and show yet farther the weakness of Mr. Clark's Argument, I observe that Mr. Clark propos'd to demonstrate that a power of Thinking or Consciousness cannot inhere in a System of Matter, *from the single Consideration of bare Sense or Consciousness it self.* His Argument is in short as follows: *Matter is a Substance consisting always of actually separate and distinct Parts; Consciousness is an Individual Power. An Individual Power cannot be added to a Substance, consisting of actually separate and distinct Parts, but by being added to all those Parts of which that Substance doth consist; whereby instead of one Consciousness, there will be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there be distinct Parts of that Substance.* This, if I mistake not, comprehends the intire strength of his Argument, with relation to which I shall lay down the following Particulars.

(1.) That our Idea, signify'd by the term *Matter* in this Dispute, is of a solid Being, which doth consist of actually separate and distinct Parts.

(2.) Saying, *That Consciousness is an Individual Power* (be they ever so many that say so) is but calling Consciousness by another name. It is not giving an account of what Consciousness is, wherein it doth consist, which is requisite to demonstrate from Consciousness, that Consciousness

cannot be added to a Being that consists of actually separate and distinct Parts. If a Man should say, that Consciousness is a Quality that makes the Being to which it is added not to consist of distinct Parts, he would (allowing the Truth of his Assertion) prove that it cannot inhere in a Being that consists of Parts, because of the obvious repugnancy there is between the Co-existence of these two Propertys, Affections, Qualitys (or call them as you please) in the same Being. But it is not enough to demonstrate that Consciousness cannot be superadded to a Being that consists of Parts, to call Consciousness by another name. If one should undertake to demonstrate to me, that Consciousness can only inhere in a System of Matter, and for this purpose should tell me, that Consciousness is an Organical Operation, I should desire him to tell me, wherein Thinking or Consciousness doth consist? for if he would do that, I should be able to know whether it is an Organical Operation or not: whereas his telling me that it is an Organical Operation, leaves me as ignorant what Thinking is, in what it does consist, as I was before those sounds reached in my Ear; and does as much suppose the thing in dispute, *That Matter can only think*, as Mr. Clark's calling Consciousness an Individual Power, in his sense of Individual

Individual Power, is supposing that Matter cannot think.

(3.) Therefore before it can be demonstrated from Consciousness, that Consciousness cannot reside in a Being that consists of actually separate and distinct Parts, it must be demonstrated, that Consciousness is *an Individual Power* in Mr. Clark's sense of those words, or that it is a Power which can only reside in an Individual Being: But Mr. Clark has not said any thing to this Question but barely by calling Consciousness *an Individual Power*. His Argument therefore, stript of all doubtful Expressions, and resting on the Proofs by which he supports it, is this: *Matter is a Substance consisting always of actually separate and distinct Parts, Consciousness cannot reside in a Being which consists of actually separate and distinct Parts; therefore Matter cannot think, or be conscious.* To support which Connexion he has no intermediate Ideas, but by saying, *Consciousness is an Individual Power, and an Individual Power cannot reside in a Being that consists of Parts; therefore Consciousness cannot reside in a Being which consists of Parts,* which carries the matter not one jot further than merely supposing Consciousness to be a Power which can only reside in an Individual Being.

(4.) Having made good my Charge against Mr. Clark's Argument, as it stands in his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, which only could lie before me when I made my Objections, and from whence Mr. Clark has urg'd nothing in his Defence, to show that he did not beg the Question, I shall consider what I can find in his *Defence*, to show that Thinking is a Power which must reside in an Individual Being. He says, *That every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any System of Matter, is nothing else but the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, inherent in all its Parts; and if Cogitation could be a Quality really inherent in Matter, it must be the Sum and Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts, which is apparently absurd.* Now tho this does not suppose Thinking to be a Power which can only reside in an Individual Being, as Mr. Clark's Argument did, yet it supposes another Proposition, *That all the Powers of any System of Matter are nothing else but the Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same kind.* From whence he infers, that Consciousness cannot reside in a System of Matter, or, which is all one, that it is an Individual Power in his sense; and therefore it lies upon him to prove that there can be no Power in a System of Matter, but what is the Sum and Result of Powers of the same kind.

(5.) Hav-

(5.) Having fully examin'd the main Argument of the first Article of Mr. *Clark's* Defence, I proceed to take notice of two or three particular Incidents in it. As,

1. Mr. *Clark* charges me with saying, P. 8.
Sweetness is in a Rose ; whereas I say quite the contrary in these words, " That a
 " Rose consists of Particles, which singly
 " and separately want a power to produce
 " that agreeable Sensation we experience
 " in them when united." And therefore
 Mr. *Clark* had no reason to show the *Vul-* P. 11.
gariness and Grofness of believing that
 Sweetness exists in Bodys to me who agreed with him, as appears by my own words. I know no one more capable of instructing others than Mr. *Clark*, and therefore I wish he had chosen some Topick wherein we differ'd ; and then how well and closely soever he had argu'd, I should have had the satisfaction either of seeing my self ingeniously oppos'd, or else have been convinc'd by him : Whereas now I appear ignorant where I am not so, and Mr. *Clark* by no means advantageously, when he gives himself the trouble to dispute with a man in Print, that he makes ignorant of the first rudiments of Natural Philosophy.

2. Mr. *Clark* says, *That the Powers in a Rose are nothing else but a number of similar Motions or Figures*, wherein there are

two things to be prov'd. (1.) That the mere Figure and Motion of the Parts of a Rose do produce, or are the sole external Cause of the Sensation caus'd by them. (2.) That those Motions and Figures are perfectly similar.

P. 13.

3. Mr. Clark says, *That Gravitation is the Effect of the continu'd and regular Operation of some other Being on Matter*: whereas it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally plac'd in it by God, and is now left to it self to act by those Original Powers. And it is as conceivable that Matter should act by virtue of those Powers, as that an Immaterial Being should originally put it into Motion, or continue it in Motion.

Señt. 2. It was objected, " Since it is
 " only requir'd that a thing be an Indivi-
 " dual Being, in order to its being a pro-
 " per Subject of a power of Thinking, or
 " at least that it may be possible for God
 " to superadd to it a power of Thinking ;
 " it is evident by Mr. Clark's own ac-
 " count of Matter, which he makes to
 " consist of *actually separate and distinct*
 " *Parts* (tho I wonder at the same time
 " he should make it *divisible*, when by its
 " consisting of separate and distinct Parts
 " it is actually divided) that those *sepa-*
 " *rate and distinct Parts* are capable of hav-
 " ing

ing a power of Thinking, or an indi-
 vidual Consciousness superadded to each
 of them ; because the want of Indivi-
 duality or Distinctness is the sole reason
 urg'd why a System of Matter cannot
 have a power of Thinking, or an indi-
 vidual Consciousness : and consequent-
 ly, according to Mr. Clark's own rea-
 soning, Matter may have a power of
 Thinking, or an Individual Conscious-
 ness." To this Mr. Clark answers,
That supposing any Particle of Matter could P. 16.
be truly an Individual, that is, an indivisi-
ble or indiscerpible Being ; yet it would not
therefore follow that it could be capable of
Thinking : for tho Divisibility or Discerpibi-
lity in any Subject is a sufficient proof that
that Subject is not capable of such an Indi-
vidual Power as Thinking ; yet it does not
from thence follow on the contrary, that what-
ever is indiscerpible, is therefore capable of
Thinking.

1st. But if Indiscerpibility be what is
 only requir'd in Mr. Clark's Argument for
 a Subject of a power of Thinking, then
 it must follow, not only that what is dis-
 cerpible cannot think, but that whatever
 is indiscerpible is capable of Thinking,
 till Mr. Clark thinks fit to add such Consi-
 derations to his *Argument*, whereby an
 individual material Being is excluded from
 a capacity of Thinking, and an individu-
 al

al immaterial Being is not : For if Indiscerpibility is all that is mention'd as requisite in a Subject for a power of Thinking, then wherever there is Indiscerpibility, there is all that is requir'd by that Argument. And so tho it does not, from *Discerpibility in any Subject's being a sufficient proof that that Subject is not capable of Thinking*, universally follow, *that whatever is indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking* ; yet it may and does follow from Mr. Clark's Argument, as it stands at present, and I desire him to shew me any one Principle, in the present Argument, from whence it cannot be as well infer'd, that an Individual Material Being is a proper Subject of a power of Thinking, as an Immaterial Being.

But Mr. Clark says, *Tho the want of Individuality or Distinctness is the sole reason urg'd in the present Argument, why a System of Matter cannot think ; yet it ought not therefore to be said, that it is only requir'd that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a power of Thinking.* Upon which I observe, that Mr. Clark owns the Truth of my reasoning upon the supposition, that Individuality is only requir'd by him in a Subject of a power of Thinking ; but denys that I have any reason to infer that Individuality is only requir'd from the want of Individuality.

Individuality's being the sole reason urg'd why a System of Matter cannot have a power of Thinking : which I cannot help thinking to be all one, till there is a Difference assign'd between only requir'd in the present Argument, and the sole reason urg'd in the present Argument.

(2.) Had I affirm'd, from the Consideration of Mr. Clark's Argument, *That whatever is indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking ;* I cannot see how Mr. Clark, consistently with the Principles on which his Argument proceeds, can urge any Considerations, whereby an Individual Material Being is excluded from a capacity of Thinking : and if he cannot, then it follows universally from his Argument, that whatever is indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. This I would show, but that Mr. Clark does deny the Supposition P. 18. on which this Objection is grounded, viz. *that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Indiscerpible Being :* and therefore I shall spare the Reader, by not arguing longer on a Supposition deny'd on both sides ; tho when I urg'd it, I took it to be Mr. Clark's Opinion, because he said, *Matter consisted of actually separate and distinct Parts :* by which words since he understands improper Parts, or Parts that seem so to us (for according to him Matter has no Parts) I own the ground of my Objection, as founded on his words, is intirely taken away.

Sett.

Sect. 3. It was objected, " Supposing
 " Mr. *Clark* had prov'd, that Conscious-
 " ness could only reside in an Individual
 " Being, and that an Individual Being
 " must be an Immaterial Being, the Soul
 " would not then be prov'd naturally Im-
 " mortal, and consequently all the pains
 " taken to prove the Soul Immaterial sig-
 " nify nothing. Nothing is prov'd natu-
 " rally Immortal by the supposition of
 " the Soul's Immateriality, but the Sub-
 " stance of the Soul. Now the Soul is
 " suppos'd to be a Thinking Immaterial
 " Being; and unless a Thinking Immate-
 " rial Being can be prov'd naturally Im-
 " mortal, the Soul cannot be prov'd na-
 " turally Immortal. But how this can be
 " done, I know not, but by showing the
 " inseparable Connexion between Imma-
 " terial Being and Thinking; and till then
 " we have as much reason to believe that
 " Thinking is an Action which may com-
 " mence after the Existence of its Subject,
 " and may perish or cease to exist, its Sub-
 " ject still remaining. And thus there is
 " no more progress made in the proof of
 " the natural Immortality of the Soul,
 " by proving its Immateriality, than there
 " would be in proving the natural Im-
 " mortality of Mens Bodys which are
 " laid in the Graves, by showing that
 " Matter

“ Matter can only perish by Annihilation :
 “ for, as in the last Case, no proof is
 “ made of the necessary continuance to-
 “ gether of the several Particles that com-
 “ pose our Bodys ; so, in the other Case,
 “ we have no proof that Thinking is an
 “ inseparable Property of Immaterial Be-
 “ ing. Of what use then is this Argument
 “ to the ends and purposes of Religion ?
 “ for if we have no security that we must
 “ exist hereafter in a state of Perception,
 “ as by only proving the natural Immor-
 “ tality of the Soul we have not, it can
 “ be of no use to influence our Lives and
 “ Actions.

To this Mr. Clark answers, *That all the* P. 21.
Qualitys and Modes of an Indiscerpible Being
are utterly incapable of being affected in any
degree by any Power in Nature ; for all real
and inherent Qualitys, of any Substance, are
either Modifications of the Substance it self,
or else Powers superadded and connected to
the Substance by the immediate Power of God :
And, in either of these Cases, 'tis manifest
no Quality can be alter'd by any natural
Power, which is not able to affect and make
some alteration in the Substance (in the Dis-
position of the Parts at least) it self, which
in an Indiscerpible Substance cannot be done.

1. Upon this Answer I observe, That
 it is inconsistent with matter of fact, or
 else supposes the Soul a Material Being :
 For

For we know by experience, that the Soul or Thinking Being undergoes several Changes or Alterations. It has not only different Passions, as Anger, Love, &c. at different times, which are Modifications of the Soul, that begin and have their period, but has Qualitys or Powers, such as Seeing and Hearing, which by the defect of our Organs plainly cease for a time. Now when Mr. *Clark* reconciles our having different Passions at different times, and our enjoying of Powers, and then losing of them, with his Notion, *That all the Qualitys and Modes of an Indiscerpible Being are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or chang'd in any degree by any Power of Nature*; I promise him to account for the possibility of Thinking's ceasing in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature. But if he cannot, what remains, but, from the Actions of our Souls which must then, according to him, be inconsistent with their Existence in an Indiscerpible Being, to conclude the Soul to be material?

2. *The Powers of Nature* signify Material and finite Immaterial Beings, and their several Powers and Operations one on another. Now till Mr. *Clark* has a compleat Idea of both sorts of Beings, their Powers and Operations one on another, it is impossible for him in many respects to
tell

tell how far they can affect one another's Operations: For instance, there are Beings in the World that think, of whose Substance I have no other Idea but that it is indiscerpible by the Powers of Nature; but yet I understand not the manner how these indiscerpible Beings think, nor how they are capable of other Qualitys, nor what other Qualitys and Powers they have. Nor do I understand all the Powers of Material or other Immaterial Beings, and the manner of their Operations; how then can I possibly tell how that of which I have no Idea may affect an Action or Power of another Being of which I have no Idea, how it is perform'd, how it inheres in its Subject, or wherein the nature of that Power consists?

3. But Mr. Clark says, *No Quality or Mode can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to effect and make some alteration of the Substance it self; which in an Indiscerpible Substance cannot be done.* In answer to which I ask Mr. Clark, whether God can destroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making some alteration in the Substance it self? If Mr. Clark replies, That God can destroy a Mode or Quality, without making some alteration in the Substance it self; then there is no repugnancy in the nature of the thing, that a Mode or Quality may be destroyed,

destroy'd, without any alteration of the
 Parts of that Substance which was the Sub-
 ject of that Mode or Quality. If he says,
 That God can destroy a Mode or Quality
 in an Immaterial Substance, without mak-
 ing any alteration in the Substance, but
 that a created Being by any Powers that it
 is capable of receiving from the hand of
 God cannot; I desire him to give me any
 Argument upon his Principles to prove cre-
 ated Beings cannot, that will not equally
 conclude against God's destroying such a
 Power, unless at the same time he annihilates
 the Subject of that Power. He cannot make
 it impossible for the Powers of an Imma-
 terial Being to cease, by the Operations of
 created Beings on it, from its Indiscernibility,
 without excluding God from putting an
 end merely to those Powers; for, ac-
 cording to Mr. *Clark*, God himself can no
 more make any alteration in the Parts of
 an Immaterial Substance, than a created
 Being can. If Mr. *Clark* replies, That
 God cannot destroy a Mode or Quality of
 an Immaterial Being, without making
 an alteration in the Parts of the Sub-
 stance: I answer, that if God does make
 any alteration in the Parts of the Sub-
 stance, upon destroying the Power or Qua-
 lity that he has superadded; then an Im-
 material Substance is plainly as discernible
 by the Power of God as a material Sub-
 stance:

stance : and all Mr. *Clark's* Arguments against the possibility of Matter's Thinking, turn upon him ; for alteration of Parts in a finite Being is as much an Evidence of Discerpibility, as Solidity is. But, lastly, if Mr. *Clark* replys, That no Power or Quality can be destroy'd, without the Annihilation of the Subject of that Power, I desire a reason may be given why God can *superadd* a Power to an Immaterial Being, as Mr. *Clark* acknowledges he can, and not P. 21. cause it to cease, its Subject remaining as it was before the Power was superadded.

4. But to give him all the Satisfaction I can, I shall instance in a Quality of Immaterial Being, that may owe its continuance to the Actions of created Beings, and may cease without making any alteration in the Substance it self. Extension not being excluded out of Mr. *Clark's* Idea of Immaterial Being, it is plain, whenever our Bodys are carry'd from one place to another, our Souls must likewise move along with 'em ; tho Motion is no doubt incompatible with Immaterial Being, in case Immaterial Being has no Extension. Now this suppos'd Motion of our Souls is intirely owing to external and material Causes, not only as to the degree of Motion, but as to the determination of the Motion ; for both the degree of Motion, and the particular determination thereof will cease upon withdrawing the external material Causes : and if any particular Motion of an Immaterial

C

Being

Being be owing to external material Causes, then all its Motions, for all we know to the contrary, may be so too; and if so, there can be no repugnancy, in supposing it possible for an Immaterial Being to be destitute of the Quality of actual Motion. And if there is no repugnancy in supposing, that Motion may be continu'd in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature, and may cease by withdrawing of those Powers; then Mr. Clark's Affirmation, *That no Quality of an Immaterial Being can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to make an Alteration (in the Disposition of the Parts at least) of the Substance it self,* is very precarious.

5. Lastly, Supposing Mr. Clark had prov'd in this Article, what I conceive he has not, That the whole Soul, the Thinking Immaterial Being, is indivisible by the Powers of Nature, or naturally immortal in that sense, yet this Indivisibility, this Natural Immortality, is no more than he allows to some Particles of Matter; for he says, *That there are original, and perfectly solid Particles, which are to any Power of Nature indiscerpible:* and he corrects me for calling any Particle of Matter an *Individual Being*, because it cannot be divided by natural Causes, or the Powers of Nature: and therefore if a Particle of Matter, notwithstanding its Indiscerpibility by natural Causes, is not naturally immortal, or indivisible in that sense,

P. 22, 23.

P. 18.

sense, in which Mr. *Clark* requires the Substance of the Soul to be, *viz.* to be indiscerpible by the Power of God, neither can the whole thinking Being be prov'd naturally immortal in that sense, unless it can be shew'd, that the whole thinking Being is indiscerpible by the Power of God; but to that Question he has not said any thing, and therefore I may conclude, that supposing *Thinking* must reside in an individual Being, or a Being that is indiscerpible by the Power of God, yet it does not follow, that the thinking immaterial Being is indiscerpible by the Power of God, or naturally immortal.

It was objected, 4. " Since an individual Being can only be the subject of
 " a Power of thinking, Why may not
 " several Particles of Matter, when united in one System, become an individual Being, and be by the Power of
 " God render'd incapable of any Division or Separation by natural Causes, and
 " consequently be a subject capable of
 " thinking? If several Particles of Matter
 " can be so united as to touch one another, or closely adhere; wherein does
 " the Distinctness or Individuality of the
 " several Particles consist? The Distinctness or Individuality is as much lost to
 " me by this suppos'd Union, as the Distinctness of the Parts of an immaterial
 " Being, upon supposition that Extension
 " is not excluded out of the Idea of Im-

Being be owing to external material Causes, then all its Motions, for all we know to the contrary, may be so too; and if so, there can be no repugnancy, in supposing it possible for an Immaterial Being to be destitute of the Quality of actual Motion. And if there is no repugnancy in supposing, that Motion may be continu'd in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature, and may cease by withdrawing of those Powers; then Mr. Clark's Affirmation, *That no Quality of an Immaterial Being can be alter'd by any natural Power, which is not able to make an Alteration (in the Disposition of the Parts at least) of the Substance it self,* is very precarious.

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P. 22, 23.

P. 18.

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 " a Power of thinking, Why may not
 " several Particles of Matter, when united in one System, become an individual Being, and be by the Power of
 " God render'd incapable of any Division
 " or Separation by natural Causes, and
 " consequently be a subject capable of
 " thinking? If several Particles of Matter
 " can be so united as to touch one another, or closely adhere; wherein does
 " the Distinctness or Individuality of the
 " several Particles consist? The Distinctness or Individuality is as much lost to
 " me by this suppos'd Union, as the Distinctness of the Parts of an immaterial
 " Being, upon supposition that Extension
 " is not excluded out of the Idea of Im-

“ materiality, as it is not by Mr. *Clark*,
 “ if I rightly apprehend him : For if the
 “ Union of material Particles be compleat
 “ and intire, I can as well conceive an im-
 “ material Being capable of Division, as
 “ conceive those Particles so united, capa-
 “ ble of Division from one another. All
 “ the Difference perceivable by us, be-
 “ tween such a material Substance, be-
 “ sides Solidity in one and want of Soli-
 “ dity in the other, lies in this, That one
 “ perhaps continues as it was created, and
 “ the other becomes by the Power of
 “ God what the other was by Creation.
 “ And what difference that will make as
 “ to one’s being capable of the Power of
 “ thinking, and the other’s not being ca-
 “ pable of that Power, does not appear to
 “ me, and never will till Thinking and
 “ Solidity are prov’d to be incompatible
 “ in the same Subject.

P. 23, 24.

To this Mr. *Clark* answers, *That the*
Case is very different, between such a Ma-
terial Being and an Immaterial Being, tho
it be suppos’d to be extended, because some
of the first and most obvious Properties,
which we certainly know of Matter, as its
having partes extra partes, strictly and
properly speaking, and its consisting of such
Parts as can exist separately and have no
Dependance on one another, do necessarily
and confessedly imply Discerpibility: But in
Immaterial Beings we do not know of any
such Propertys as any wise imply Discerpibility.

The

The Case is not different between such a Material Being as I have describ'd, and a finite extended Immaterial Being: for tho all Matter does consist of Parts, that have no dependance on one another for their Existence; yet by the Supposition in the Objection, it is as indiscerpible by natural Causes as an Immaterial Being. Now this Supposition Mr. *Clark* is so far from denying to be possible, that he grants it to be true in fact, *That there* P. 22, *are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers in Nature indiscerpible.* And if there are or may be Systems of Matter, which imply Indiscerpibility by natural Causes, tho they are allow'd discerpible by the Power of God, there can be no difference between those Systems of Matter, and any other finite extended Beings, as to their Divisibility by the Powers of Nature. Nor can there be any difference as to their Divisibility by the Power of God, for all finite extended Beings must so far consist of Parts, that the Part of one side is not the Part of the other side. They can only consist in a Continuity of the same Substance: and why such a Substance should not be as divisible as a perfectly continu'd solid Substance, I can see no reason. Let Mr. *Clark* show that a continu'd solid Substance is discerpible by the Power of God, and the same Argument will equally show the Discerpibility of any other finite continu'd Substance.

Suppose the Substance of the Soul to be four Inches square (for when once Extension is allow'd to the Soul, such a Supposition becomes reasonable) I ask Mr. *Clark*, If that Substance at its Creation did not depend entirely on the Will of God as to the Degree of its Extension, as much as any of those perfectly solid Particles of Matter did, which are allow'd to be indiscerpible by the Powers of Nature? and whether God could not have made it two Inches square, had he pleas'd, as well as any of those Particles smaller? Both which, I suppose, Mr. *Clark* will allow. Then I ask him, If God can make Immaterial Beings of different Dimensions, what can hinder him from making an Immaterial Being less than when he first created it, that will not hinder him from making a *continu'd* solid Being less than when he first created that? It does not appear to me, that an Inch on one side of an Immaterial Being is more dependent on an Inch on the other side, as to each other's Existence, than two sides of a perfectly solid Particle of Matter are. So that I think we have as clear Evidence, *we do as much know* of a Property in Immaterial Substance, which implys Discerpibility, as we do in some Particles of Matter; continu'd Extension in a Being as much implying Discerpibility, as continu'd Solidity. But Mr. *Clark* says, *As the known parts of Space can demonstrably*

monstrably be prov'd to be absolutely indiscerpible; so it ought not to be reckon'd an insuperable Difficulty, to imagin extended Immaterial Substance may be so likewise.

Tho the known Parts of Space can be demonstrated to be absolutely indiscerpible; yet it may be, and is an insuperable Difficulty to imagin an Immaterial Substance may be so likewise, because Space is infinitely extended, and because it is nothing but the meer Absence or Place of Bodys; whereas Immaterial Being is something extended and finite. Now if all finite extended Beings are divisible by the Power of God, then all Mr. Clark says against Matter's thinking has equal Force (if it has any at all) against an Immaterial Being's thinking, as will appear by his own Words, if we put immaterial or extended Being in the place of the term Matter or material Being. Suppose, says he, *an Extended Being as small*

P. 18, 19.

as you please, indu'd with Consciousness or Thought; yet if by the Power of God this Extended Being may be divided into two parts, what will naturally and consequently become of its Power of thinking? If that Power continue in it unchang'd; then there must be two distinct Consciousnesses in the two separate parts; or else the Power continuing in the intermediate Distance or Space, as well as in the Parts themselves, must there subsist without a Subject; or else not the material Substance, but some other thing is

the Subject of the Consciousness. If the Power of thinking will remain only in one of the separated Parts; then either that one Part only had at first the Power residing in it, and then the same Question will return upon the Supposition of its being likewise divided; or else it will follow that one and the same Individual Quality may be transfer'd from one Subject to another, which all Philosophers of all Sects in the World have always confest to be impossible. If in the last place it be said, that upon the Division of an Extended Being, the Power of thinking which was in it will wholly cease; then it will follow, that that was never or at all a real Quality inhering and residing in the Substance (in which mere Separation of Parts makes no Alteration) but that it was a mere external Denomination, as the Roundness of a Being which perishes at its being divided: And this he supposes will be granted to be sufficiently absurd.

It was objected, in the fifth and last place. “ But let us suppose, that from
 “ the Power of thinking or Individual
 “ Consciousness, we can prove the Imma-
 “ teriality of the Soul, and from its Imma-
 “ teriality prove its natural Immortality,
 “ and then see what will be the Conse-
 “ quence. All the numerous sensible Crea-
 “ tures in the Universe are put in the same
 “ Condition with Man, and made capable
 “ of Eternal Happiness as well as he.
 “ Now to avoid this Consequence there
 “ are

“ are two things principally urg’d.

“ 1. That all those Creatures (which I call sensible) are only mere Machines ; or,

“ 2. That their Souls shall be annihilated with their Bodies.

“ To the first I answer, That Experience as much convinces us, that they perceive, think, &c. as that Men do : They avoid Pain and seek Pleasure, and give as good marks of Uneasiness under the one and Satisfaction under the other, as Men do ; they avoid Pain, and seek Pleasure by the same Motives that Men do, *viz.* by reflecting on their past Actions, and the Actions of their Fellows, with the Consequences of them ; which is evident from their acting more to their own Advantage, the more Experience they have had. But if after all Brutes are only mere Machines, the difficulty of proving the Soul immaterial will be increas’d : for if the Operations of Brutes are not sufficient to distinguish them from Clocks and Watches, the Operations of Men will not prove *them* to be superior to Machines.

“ To the second Objection I answer, That if the Souls of Brutes are annihilated on the Dissolution of their Bodys, then the proof of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls really be Immortal, because mere natural Immortality is not a Security from

“ from Annihilation, as is suppos’d in the
“ Objection.

P. 26.

To which Mr. Clark answers, *That tho sensible Creatures have certainly something in them that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they must needs be annihilated upon the Dissolution of their Bodys, or else be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man. This is just such an Argument as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself, can therefore have no Being at all. The strength of this Answer lies in my supposing either a necessity of Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Dissolution of their Bodys, or else that they become capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man; which should I allow to be what I intended, yet it would not be just such an Argument as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself can therefore have no Being at all; because it does not place an Opposition between a capacity of the Soul’s Eternal Happiness, and not existing at all, but between a capacity of Eternal Happiness, and not existing after the Dissolution of their Bodys. And therefore tho it may follow from the Argument, that whatever Immaterial Being has not a capacity of Eternal Happiness cannot exist after the Dissolution of the Body to which it was join’d; yet it by no means follows, That no Immaterial Being or Soul can exist at all, unless it has a capacity of Eternal Happiness as well as*
Man;

Man ; or, in Mr. Clark's words, *is not exactly like himself* as to that capacity. But it was very far from my Intention to argue, that there was either a necessity of the Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Dissolution of their Bodys, or else that they would be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man ; but only to argue either the necessity of Annihilation some time or other, or else that Brutes would be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man. For when I objected to my self, *That the Souls of Brutes shall be annihilated with the Dissolution of their Bodys*, I consider'd, that those who would suppose an Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes, would be most likely to pitch on the Dissolution of the Body as the proper Term or Period for the Existence of their Souls, as I could show from the several Answerers of Mr. Dodwell ; who only from his supposing the Soul to be naturally mortal, tho capable of Immortality, conclude the time of the Dissolution of the Body the proper time for the actual Mortality of the Soul. And therefore I crave leave to understand Mr. Clark's Argument after this manner, *That tho all sensible Creatures have certainly in them something that is Immaterial ; yet it does not at all follow either that they must needs be annihilated, or else that they must be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man.* To which I reply, That since Mr. Clark does allow, that all the sensible Creatures
in

in the Universe are not mere Machines, by acknowledging *that they have all something in them that is Immaterial*, I desire him to tell me, consistently with the Principles of his foregoing Argument for the natural Immortality of the thinking Immaterial Being in us, what else remains reasonable, but that they be suppos'd sometime or other to be annihilated, or else be suppos'd capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man : for they having something Immaterial in them must, according to Mr. *Clark*, for ever, without Annihilation, enjoy the Power of Perception; and if they must have for ever a Power of Perception, they must have either agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions ; and if they must have either agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, they must be suppos'd capable of eternal agreeable Perceptions, unless Mr. *Clark* will say, that they are only capable of an eternal Mixture of agreeable and disagreeable Perceptions, or only capable of eternal disagreeable Perceptions : which, since they are unreasonable Suppositions, and would destroy all proof of Man's Capacity for a happy Immortality from the Argument now in question, I dare say he will not affirm.

My last Objection therefore clear'd from all doubtfulness arising from Expression, and to which I should be glad to receive a good Answer, stands thus, That if from the Power of Thinking we can prove the
Imma-

Immateriality of the Soul of Man, and from its Immateriality prove its natural Immortality, and consequently its capacity of Eternal Happiness; the Power of Thinking must prove the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, the Immateriality of their Souls must prove their natural Immortality, and consequently their Capacity of Eternal Happiness. If it be suppos'd that the Souls of Brutes may be sometime or other annihilated, then this Argument is not useful to the end for which it is intended ; because natural Immortality will then be no proof of the real Immortality of the Soul of Man.

P O S T S C R I P T.

SINCE the finishing this Reply to Mr. *Clark*, I have met with Mr. *Milles's* Answer to Mr. *Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse*, in the Preface whereof he has endeavour'd to defend Mr. *Clark's Argument for the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul* against my Objections, but upon Principles which intirely overthrow it, and by putting such a sense on Mr. *Clark's* words as is inconsistent with what Mr. *Clark* understands by them in his *Defence*. As for instance, Mr. *Milles* says, Pref. p. 6. *If that which thinks within us be extended, it must consist of Parts ; and that by Individu-* P. 7.
al Being, in Mr. Clark's reasoning, we are to understand an unextended Being : And again, That I did not rightly apprehend Mr.
Clark

Clark, when I said *Extension* was not excluded by him out of his *Idea of Immateriality*. Whereas Mr. Clark is so far from objecting any such mistake to me, and from supposing, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it must consist of Parts*, that in the fourth Article of his *Defence* he argues with me as not mistaking his meaning, by allowing *Extension* not to be excluded out of his *Idea of Immateriality*, and gives up his Argument, in case I prove that whatever is finitely extended must consist of Parts; that is, prove what Mr. Milles grants to be true, and insists on in defence of Mr. Clark. Therefore instead of returning any particular Answer to Mr. Milles's Observations, I refer him for satisfaction to Mr. Clark's *Defence*, where he may not only see that he has mistaken Mr. Clark's meaning, but that Mr. Clark's Argument cannot be defended by him till he retracts his *Preface*: for if an Immaterial Being or Soul be, according to Mr. Clark, an extended Being, and yet indiscerpible both by the Powers of Nature and the Power of God, then Mr. Milles's Assertions, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it must consist of Parts, and that it is impossible that what has Parts should be the Subject of Thought*, do overthrow Mr. Clark's demonstration of the Immateriality of the Soul; for if whatever is extended must consist of Parts, and if that which consists of Parts cannot think, then

Mr.

Mr. *Clark's* Immaterial Being cannot think, and consequently the Immateriality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clark's* sense, is destroy'd by Mr. *Milles's* Defence : and therefore if Mr. *Milles* undertakes again Mr. *Clark's* Defence, he must first retract this Principle in his Preface, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it must consist of Parts*, before he can demonstrate the Indiscernibility of an extended Being ; that is, before he can prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clark's* sense.

Tho Mr. *Milles* has thus egregiously mistaken Mr. *Clark*, yet it is but just to let the Reader see the reason he assigns why Mr. *Clark* must understand by Immaterial Being, unextended Being. *The Remarker*, says P. 10. he, *has done Mr. Clark a great deal of wrong in saying he does not exclude Extension out of the Idea of Immateriality ; since it is plain our Argument would have no force, but upon supposition that the immaterial thinking Substance within us is prov'd not to be extended.* For which Argument I shall not return him the Civility he bestows on me, in supposing that I despise Logick, but take the liberty to P. 16. attribute it to a more indisputable Cause, notwithstanding he has the modesty to say, *He has taken the liberty to imitate the great* P. 22. *Mr. Chillingworth throughout his Treatise.*

As Mr. *Milles* does not sufficiently agree with Mr. *Clark* in Principles, in order to defend him ; so Mr. *Milles* and I are not sufficiently agreed in common Principles to dispute

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dispute with one another. In a matter of Speculation it is not the Authority of *Tully* himself, could his Opinions be known (I say could they be known, because he does not always tell us on what side he is in his Philosophical Dialogues) nor all the Philosophers that ever liv'd, much less the Fathers of the Church, that has any weight with me. It is Reason alone, from what hand soever it comes, to which I am ready to pay my Submission, and it is by that alone that Mr. *Clark* and I propose to be determin'd ; and therefore when Mr. *Milles* urges no other Argument to prove the Power of Thinking inseparable from Immaterial Being, but by saying, *The Power of Thinking has been always look'd upon, and is now by every one acknowledg'd to be a necessary Property of Immateriality*, I think it fruitless to contend with a Man who knows not that the Question between Mr. *Clark* and me is not a Question that depends on the Opinion of any Man, nor that Mr. *Clark* propos'd only by the *Argument* I have examin'd to demonstrate the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul by reason. In short, his arguing from fact is as foreign to the Matter, as if I should use some topical Arguments to prove the Fathers profound Philosophers, when that Question can only be determin'd by an Induction of particular Passages out of their Works, to which end Mr. *Milles's* and Mr. *Dodwell's* Writings may perhaps be allow'd very useful.

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F I N I S.